#### SMRs are competitive and get more so over time

Taso 2011 (Firas Eugen Taso, masters thesis for double MA in Urban and Environmental Policy Planning and Law and Diplomacy from Tufts, May 2011, “21st Century Civilian Nuclear Power and the Role of Small Modular Reactors,” online)

First is the economic cost. Large plants are, as was previously discussed, expensive and

utilities find it hard, without government support and given their market capitalization, to fund a large nuclear plant. This is one of the major reasons why, in the US, there have been no new plants built in the past 30 years. However, SMRs present a new alternative. While they appear to be higher in cost that large nuclear per kW produced (according to the model large nuclear is around 6 cents per kWh, while B&W cites a price of 8 or 9 cents per kWh, and others, like NuScale are in the same range), and in fact might be more expensive than large nuclear power plants, as is the case with the Russian KTL-40S according to Matthew Bunn, the upfront cost of building an SMR is in the hundreds of millions of dollars range, not billions. And while it is true that to get to a capacity of over 1 GWe, a utility would need to spend billions on SMRs, their modularity and scalability allows utilities to stagger the construction and therefore incur lower capital and financing costs for incremental units. Again, it is important to note that since no reactors have been built, it is impossible to determine the actual cost of a unit and an array, which is an important point when comparing small nuclear with its larger cousin.¶ According to the Economist, a plant with 12 reactors, each with its own electricity- generating turbine, would cost about $2.2 billion and produce roughly a third as much power as a big facility. Since large plants can cost roughly three times as much, the cost of electricity would be similar. Moreover, a modular facility would generate revenue as soon as the first reactor is fired up, after a few years of construction, while a big reactor traditionally takes a decade to erect.225 Furthermore, while large plants provide economies of scale, once SMRs start being produced industrially, a learning curve and resulting price reduction are likely to occur, according to industry experts, lowering the price and making them more competitive.

#### Collapse of natural gas industry inevitable- Overleveraged, prices too low

**Fahey 2012** (Jonathan Fahey, April 9, 2012, “Natural gas glut means drilling boom must slow,” Boston Globe, lexis)

The U.S. natural gas market is bursting at the seams. So much natural gas is being produced that soon there may be nowhere left to put the country's swelling surplus. After years of explosive growth, natural gas producers are retrenching. The underground salt caverns, depleted oil fields and aquifers that store natural gas are rapidly filling up after a balmy winter depressed demand for home heating. The glut has benefited businesses and homeowners that use natural gas. But with natural gas prices at a 10-year low — and falling — companies that produce the fuel are becoming victims of their drilling successes. Their stock prices are falling in anticipation of declining profits and scaled-back growth plans. Some of the nation's biggest natural gas producers, including Chesapeake Energy, ConocoPhillips and Encana Corp., have announced plans to slow down. "They've gotten way ahead of themselves, and winter got way ahead of them too," says Jen Snyder, head of North American gas for the research firm Wood Mackenzie. "There hasn't been enough demand to use up all the supply being pushed into the market." So far, efforts to limit production have barely made a dent. Unless the pace of production declines sharply or demand picks up significantly this summer, analysts say the nation's storage facilities could reach their limits by fall. That would cause the price of natural gas, which has been halved over the past year, to nosedive. Citigroup commodities analyst Anthony Yuen says the price of natural gas — now $2.08 per 1,000 cubic feet — could briefly fall below $1. "There would be no floor," he says. Since October, the number of drilling rigs exploring for natural gas has fallen by 30 percent to 658, according to the energy services company Baker Hughes. Some of the sharpest drop-offs have been in the Haynesville Shale in Northwestern Louisiana and East Texas and the Fayetteville Shale in Central Arkansas. But natural gas production is still growing, the result of a five-year drilling boom that has peppered the country with wells. The workers and rigs aren't just being sent home. They are instead being put to work drilling for oil, whose price has averaged more than $100 a barrel for months. The oil rig count in the U.S is at a 25-year high. This activity is adding to the natural gas glut because natural gas is almost always a byproduct of oil drilling. Analysts say that before long companies could have to start slowing the gas flow from existing wells or even take the rare and expensive step of capping off some wells completely. "Something is going to have to give," says Maria Sanchez, manager of energy analysis at Bentek Energy, a research firm. U.S. natural gas production has boomed in recent years as a result of new drilling techniques that allow companies to unlock fuel trapped in shale formations. Last year, the U.S. produced an average of 63 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day, a 24 percent increase from 2006. But over that period consumption has grown half as fast. The nation's storage facilities could easily handle this extra supply until recently because cold winters pushed up demand for heating and hot summers led to higher demand for air conditioning. Just over half the nation's homes are heated with natural gas, and one-quarter of its electricity is produced by gas-fired power plants. But this past winter was the fourth warmest in the last 117 years, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. It was the warmest March since 1950. Between November and March, daily natural gas demand fell 5 percent, on average, from a year earlier, according to Bentek Energy. Yet production grew 8 percent over the same period. "We haven't ever seen a situation like this before," says Chris McGill, Vice President for Policy Analysis at the American Gas Association, an industry group. At the end of winter, there is usually about 1.5 trillion cubic feet of gas in storage. Today there is 2.5 trillion cubic feet because utilities withdrew far less than usual this past winter. There is 4.4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas storage capacity in the U.S. If full, that would be enough fuel to supply the country for about 2 months. If current production and consumption trends were to continue, Bentek estimates that storage facilities would be full on October 10. Storage capacity, which has grown by 15 percent over the past decade, cannot be built fast enough to address the rapidly expanding glut. And analysts note there is little financial incentive to build more anyway.

#### Wrecks economy without the aff

Whitman 2012 (Christine Todd Whitman, former EPA Administrator and Governor of New Jersey, May 9, 2012, “It's dangerous to depend on natural gas,” CNN Money, http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/09/christine-whitman-nuclear-energy/)

The United States needs an "all of the above" energy strategy that focuses on low-carbon electricity sources that will lower energy costs, reduce dependency on foreign fuel sources and promote clean electricity. This is a prudent strategy to help drive American manufacturing and transportation networks of the future. Most importantly, this approach can put the country on a sustainable path toward long-term economic growth.¶ While today's rock-bottom natural gas prices are attractive, an unbalanced dependence on natural gas in the electricity sector would put Americans at risk, both economically and in terms of longer term energy security.¶ While many look at energy prices from today's lens, successful energy policy requires a long view that promotes fuel diversity but doesn't pick technology winners; it preserves our air, land and water and is affordable for consumers.¶ We need only look at the volatile history of natural gas prices. Consider the shift from the low, stable prices of the 1990s to the record-high rates and wild supply fluctuations of the mid-2000s.¶ We should take advantage of our domestic energy resources, recognizing that today's natural gas market is still vulnerable. The present oversupply of natural gas opens opportunities for exports into foreign markets at prices two-to-three times higher. If demand from other countries increases as they meet growing energy demand, it will cause our prices to align with higher world prices. During my tenure as governor of a state that relies heavily on nuclear energy, I can attest to the cost effectiveness of nuclear fuel and the protection it offers against price spikes in natural gas or future environmental controls such as a cost on carbon. Nuclear energy doesn't emit any greenhouse gases or controlled pollutants while producing power and it is affordable, predictable and efficient. Moreover, a nuclear power plant with a footprint of one square mile generates the same amount of energy as 20 square miles of solar panels or 2,400 wind turbines spread out across 235 square miles.

#### Latent power ensures U.S. hegemony can withstand any challenge – estimates of American power don’t take hidden safeguards into account.

William Wohlforth (Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, where he is also the Chair of the Department of Government) Spring, 2007 "Unipolar Stability," Harvard International Review Vol. XXIX, No. 1 p 47-8

U.S. military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroad—notably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from "imperial overstretch." And if U.S. power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged. Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term "imperial overstretch" to describe the situation in which a state's actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted with what might be termed "self-inflicted overstretch"—a situation in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today. But the U.S. government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is lighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to he fighting a global "war" on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure. Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, U.S. citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. The country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only about 4 percent of its GDP on the military as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically, it could reinstitute military' conscription, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers. On the economic front, it could raise taxes in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house hack in order. No one knows for sure what would happen if a U.S. president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decades. Most of those who study U.S. politics would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such power-generating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the public's perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support. With latent power in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in self-rein forcing mechanisms than many analysts realize, it is often noted that the rise of a peer competitor to the United States might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers. For example, China's rise might push India and Japan closer to the United States—indeed, this has already happened to some extent. There is also the strong possibility that a peer rival that comes to be seen as a threat would create strong incentives for the United States to end its self inflicted overstretch and tap potentially large wellsprings of latent power.

### cap

#### Interpretation: The aff gets to weigh the impacts of a policy implemented by the USFG. The neg must prove the plan is worse than the status quo or offer a competitive counter advocacy.

#### This interpretation is best:

#### Most predictable—grounded in the resolution

#### Alternative frameworks are infinite and unpredictable lets the neg frame the debate, makes aff win impossible.

Perm both

Perm do the aff and the alt in every non-competitive instance.

Either the alt solves all the residual links to the aff or it doesn’t solve at all.

Alt doesn’t solve the aff—we outweigh—floating PIKs bad—moving target, jacks ground, bad education, encourages research on monolithic causes rather than specific internal links

Extinction precludes value to life and discussion

#### Predictions are inevitable and good

George Friedman (founder of Stratfor) May 2008 “The Love of One’s Own and the Importance of Place” Stratfor

Forecasting is built into the human condition. Each action a human being takes is intended to have a certain outcome. The right to assume that outcome derives from a certain knowledge of how things work. Sometimes, the action has unexpected and unintended consequences. The knowledge of how things work is imperfect. But there is a huge gulf between the uncertainty of a prediction and the impossibility of a prediction. When I get up and turn on the hot water, it is with the expectation that the hot water will be there. It isn’t always there and I may not have a full understanding of why it will be there, but in general, it is there and I can predict that. A life is made up of a fabric of such expectations and predictions. There is no action taken that is not done with the expectation, reasonable or not, erroneous or not, of some predictable consequence. The search for predictability suffuses all of the human condition. Students choose careers by trying to predict what would please them when they are 30 years older, what would be useful and therefore make them money and so on. Businesses forecast what can be sold and to whom. We forecast the weather, the winners of elections, the consequences of war and so on. There is no level on which human beings live that they don’t make forecasts and, therefore, on which they don’t act as if the world were to some degree predictable.

#### Even if there is no absolute truth, we can create provisional consensus and common understanding

Yale Ferguson (Professor of International Relations at Rutgers) and Richard Mansbach (Professor of International Relations at Iowa State) 2002 *International Relations and the “Third Debate,”* ed. Jarvis

Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), there is often a sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make for a useful conversation. That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy the philosophical nit-pickers, but it can be educational and illuminating. We gain a degree of apparently useful “understanding” about the things we need (or prefer) to “know.”

#### Their argument devolves into endless discussion- the only way to ever take action is aff method

Richard Allen Posner (born January 11, 1939) is an American jurist, legal theorist, and economist who is currently a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago and a Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. He is an influential figure in the law and economics school of thought. 2004 CATASTROPHE RISK AND RESPONSE

And here is a paradox: despite their much more powerful apparatus of inquiry, scientists are more tentative than lawyers. Scientists talk more in terms of "theory" and "hypothesis" and "data" and "belief" than of "fact" and "truth," which are terms that pervade legal discourse. Obviously there are many scientific facts and scientific truths, but they are not the focus of interest. In Karl Popper's influential theory of scientific inquiry, the march of science is a process of error correction, and truth its ever-receding goal. That way of thinking is alien to the legal profession. A lawyer says, "My client is innocent, and that's the truth." More than a rhetoric of certitude is involved. Lawyers inhabit a plane of inquiry where facts are salient, such as the date of an automobile accident or the date the plaintiff filed his case. Even in this age of science, their concern is mainly with the visible everyday world, the world navigable by common sense. For present purposes, the deepest difference between law (and other social sciences) and the natural sciences may be that the orientation of the former is toward action and of the latter toward knowledge. That is one reason scientists cannot be entrusted with the defense of the nation and the human race, whether it is defense against the public enemy or (an overlapping category) against the catastrophic risks with which this book is concerned. This is not a criticism of science or scientists. To seekers after knowledge, measures of protection against dangerous knowledge, such as knowledge of how to use gene splicing to create a more lethal pathogen, are simply an impediment, and the value of astronomical skills in crafting a defense against asteroid collisions simply an irrelevance.

#### Total rejection of security discourse causes war.

Charles F. Doran is Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Washington DC, “Is Major War Obsolete? An Exchange” Survival, vol. 41, no. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 139—52

The conclusion, then, is that the probability of major war declines for some states, but increases for others. And it is very difficult to argue that it has disappeared in any significant or reliable or hopeful sense. Moreover, a problem with arguing a position that might be described as utopian is that such arguments have policy implications. It is worrying that as a thesis about the obsolescence of major war becomes more compelling to more people, including presumably governments, the tendency will be to forget about the underlying problem, which is not war per Se, but security. And by neglecting the underlying problem of security, the probability of war perversely increases: as governments fail to provide the kind of defence and security necessary to maintain deterrence, one opens up the possibility of new challenges. In this regard it is worth recalling one of Clauswitz’s most important insights: A conqueror is always a lover of peace. He would like to make his entry into our state unopposed. That is the underlying dilemma when one argues that a major war is not likely to occur and, as a consequence, one need not necessarily be so concerned about providing the defences that underlie security itself. History shows that surprise threats emerge and rapid destabilising efforts are made to try to provide that missing defence, and all of this contributes to the spiral of uncertainty that leads in the end to war.

#### The alternative fails and causes a spiral of insecurity that causes the most violent aspects of your impact claims – only taking strategic political action like the plan solves

P. H. Liotta (Professor of Humanities at Salve Regina University, Newport, RI, andExecutive Director of the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy) 2005 “Through the Looking Glass” Sage Publications

Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all these concepts work in theory but fail in practice. While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications. With regard to environmental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to watersheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer toaddressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come – is perhaps the only appropriate first response. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be decades and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, military engagement. Rather than justifying intervention (especially military), we ought to be justifying investment. Simply addressing the immensities of these challenges is not enough. Radical improvements in public infrastructure and support for better governance, particularly in states and municipalities (especially along the Lagos–Cairo–Karachi–Jakarta arc), will both improve security and create the conditions for shrinking the gap between expectations and opportunity. A real debate ought to be taking place today. Rather than dismissing ‘alternative’ security foci outright, a larger examination of what forms of security are relevant and right among communities, states, and regions, and which even might apply to a global rule-set – as well as what types of security are not relevant – seems appropriate and necessary. If this occurs, a truly remarkable tectonic shift might take place in the conduct of international relations and human affairs. Perhaps, in the failure of states and the international community to respond to such approaches, what is needed is the equivalent of the 1972 Stockholm conference that launched the global environmental movement and established the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), designed to be the environmental conscience of the United Nations. Similarly, the UN Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996 focused on the themes of finding adequate shelter for all and sustaining human development in an increasingly urbanized world. Whether or not these programs have the ability to influence the future’s direction (or receive wide international support) is a matter of some debate. Yet, given that the most powerful states in the world are not currently focusing on these issues to a degree sufficient to produce viable implementation plans or development strategies, there may well need to be a ‘groundswell’ of bottom-up pressure, perhaps in the form of a global citizenry petition to push the elusive world community toward collective action.Recent history suggests that military intervention as the first line of response to human security conditions underscores a seriously flawed approach. Moreover, those who advocate that a state’s disconnectedness from globalization is inversely proportional to the likelihood of military (read: US) intervention fail to recognize unfolding realities (Barnett, 2003, 2004). Both middle-power and major-power states, as well as the international community, must increasingly focus on long-term creeping vulnerabilities in order to avoid crisis responses to conditions of extreme vulnerability. Admittedly, some human security proponents have recently soured on the viability of the concept in the face of recent ‘either with us or against us’ power politics (Suhrke, 2004). At the same time, and in a bit more positive light, some have clearly recognized the sheer impossibility of international power politics continuing to feign indifference in the face of moral categories. As Burgess (2004: 278) notes, ‘for all its evils, one of the promises of globalization is the unmasking of the intertwined nature of ethics and politics in the complex landscape of social, economic, political and environmental security’. While it is still not feasible to establish a threshold definition for human security that neatly fits all concerns and arguments (as suggested by Owen, 2004: 383), it would be a tragic mistake to assume that national, human, and environmental security are mutually harmonious constructs rather than more often locked in conflictual and contested opposition with each other. Moreover, aspects of security resident in each concept are indeed themselves embedded with extraordinary contradictions. Human security, in particular, is not now, nor should likely ever be, the mirror image of national security. Yet, these contradictions are not the crucial recognition here. On the contrary, rather than focusing on the security issues themselves, we should be focusing on the best multi-dimensional approaches to confronting and solving them. One approach, which might avoid the massive tidal impact of creeping vulnerabilities, is to sharply make a rudder shift from constant crisis intervention toward strategic planning, strategic investment, and strategic attention. Clearly, the time is now to reorder our entire approach to how we address – or fail to address – security.

#### No mindless intervention

Mandelbaum 2011 (Michael Mandelbaum, A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “CFR 90th Anniversary Series on Renewing America: American Power and Profligacy,” Jan 2011)

I think it is, Richard. And I think that this period really goes back two decades. I think the wars or the interventions in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Haiti belong with the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, although they were undertaken by different administrations for different reasons, and had different costs. But all of them ended up in the protracted, unexpected, unwanted and expensive task of nation building. Nation building has never been popular. The country has never liked it. It likes it even less now. And I think we're not going to do it again. We're not going to do it because there won't be enough money. We're not going to do it because there will be other demands on the public purse. We won't do it because we'll be busy enough doing the things that I think ought to be done in foreign policy. And we won't do it because it will be clear to politicians that the range of legitimate choices that they have in foreign policy will have narrowed and will exclude interventions of that kind. So I believe and I say in the book that the last -- the first two post-Cold War decades can be seen as a single unit. And that unit has come to an end.

#### No Impact - Biopolitics does not cause huge global massacres

Mika Ojakangas (PhD in Social Science and Academy research fellow @ the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies @ University of Helsinki) 2005 “The Impossible Dialogue on Biopower: Foucault and Agamben,” May 2005, Foucault Studies, No. 2, http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf

Admittedly, in the era of biopolitics, as Foucault writes, even “massacres have become vital.” This is not the case, however, because violence is hidden in the foundation of biopolitics, as Agamben believes. Although the twentieth century thanatopolitics is the “reverse of biopolitics”, it should not be understood, according to Foucault, as “the effect, the result, or the logical consequence” of biopolitical rationality. Rather, it should be understood, as he suggests, as an outcome of the “demonic combination” of the sovereign power and biopower, of “the citycitizen game and the shepherd-flock game” or as I would like to put it, of patria potestas (father’s unconditional power of life and death over his son) and cura maternal (mother’s unconditional duty to take care of her children). Although massacres can be carried out in the name of care, they do not follow from the logic of biopower for which death is the “object of taboo”. They follow from the logic of sovereign power, which legitimates killing by whatever arguments it chooses, be it God, Nature, or life.

#### Life has inherent value - and Life is key to that value.

Dave Pizer. "Argument That Life Has Inherent Value." 8 Jul. 2001 http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/dsp.cgi?msg=16930

Argument that life has inherent value The concept of value comes from what living beings will pay for something. How much one being is willing to give in order to get something he wants is a way to think of the value of that thing. What a being is willing to pay for something depends on how much he desires that thing. So indirectly, desire is what actually sets the value of something. 2. In order to desire something, the thing doing the desiring must be alive - it must be a living being. So value, the end of desire, is dependent on life. Only living things (living beings) can give value to something else. 3. In order for any first thing to give something to a second thing, the first thing must first have it to give. So if only living things can give value, then living things must have value. 4Desire can only come from, (and so must be in), living beings. So when living things desire something, that desire must be inherent in the living things. If desire in living things is what gives value to other things, and that desire is inherent in the living thing, then living things, or life, has inherent value in it. Or to say it another way: If an object gives something value, that object must have value in it as a quality to give. Example: For me to love my dog, I must first have love in me. For me to value my dog, I must first have value in me. 5. Put another way, if a living being has some quality, that quality is a part of what makes that being what it is. 6If life gives value to life, than one of the parts of life is value. Put another way, value cannot exist without life, so value is life and life is value. 7If value is only relative, then saying life being valuable relative to life is the same as saying life has worth relative to life. Anything that is relative to itself is an unconditional part of itself and therefore has "inherentness". 8. THEREFORE, anyway you look at it, life is value and value is life - and life has inherent value.

#### Ontology does not come first.

David Owen Millennium Journale of international studies 2002 “Re-Orientation Internatioal Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theoryto recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity.

#### Critiquing security isn’t enough – political action is necessary and the perm solves

Pinar Bilgin (Department of International Relations Bilkent University Ankara) 2005 “Regional Security in the Middle East” p. 60-1

Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first step. In other words, from a critical security perspective, self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in themselves. They should be compounded by other forms of practice (that is, action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for change immanent in world politics and suggesting emancipatory practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. Cognisant of the need to find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero-sum thinking and practices, students of critical approaches to security have suggested the imagining, creation and nurturing of security communities as emancipatory practices (Booth 1994a; Booth and Vale 1997). Although Devetak's approach to the theory/practice relationship echoes critical approaches' conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go further in shaping global practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997:114) writes: Thinking about thinking is important, but, more urgently, so is thinking about doing…. Abstract ideas about emancipation will not suffice: it is important for Critical Security Studies to engage with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. In this sense, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first (albeit crucial) step. It is vital for the students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice.

#### Discursive focus generates epistemological blind spots and wont alter security structures

Adrian Hyde-Price (Professor of International Politics at Bath) 2001 “Europes new security challenges” p. 39

Securitization thus focuses almost exclusively on the discursive domain and eschews any attempt to determine empirically what constitutes security concerns. It does not aspire to comment on the reality behind a securitization discourse or on the appropriate instruments for tackling security problems. Instead, it suggests that security studies – or what Waever calls securitization studies –should focus on the discursive moves whereby issues are securitized. The Copenhagen school thus emphasizes the need to understand the “speech acts” that accomplish a process of securitization. Their focus is on the linguistic and conceptual dynamics involved, even though they recognize the importance of the institutional setting within which securitization takes place. The concept of securitization offers some important insights for security studies. However, it is too epistemologically restricted to contribute to a significant retooling of security studies. On the positive side, it draws attention to the way in which security agendas are constructed bgy politicians and other political actors. It also indicates the utility of discourse analysis as an additional tool of analysis for security studies. However, at best, securitization studies can contribute one aspect of security studies. It cannot provide the foundations for a paradigm shift in the subdiscipline. Its greatest weakness is its epistemological hypochondria. That is, its tendency to reify epistemological problems and push sound observations about knowledge claims to their logical absurdity. Although it isimportant to understand the discursive moves involved in perception of security in, say, the Middle East, it is also necessary to make some assessment of nondiscursive factors like the military balance or access to freshwater supplies. For the Copenhagen school, however, these nondiscursive factors are relegated to second place. They are considered only to the extent that they facilitate or impede the speech act. In this way, the Copenhagen school is in danger of cutting security studies off from serious empirical research and setting it adrift on a sea of floating signifiers.

#### Realism is inevitable – you’re alt cant change it

Guzzini 1998 Stefano Guzzini, Assis. Prof @ Central European U, Realism in Int’l Relations, 1998, p. 212

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.